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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
NANCY L. KEMPf : 
Petitioner, Appellee, : Case No. 2000431-CA 
and Cross-Appellant, 
v. 
PAUL G. KEMP, Priority No. 15 
Respondent, Appellant, 
and Cross-Appellee. : 
BRIEF OF CROSS-APPELLANT AND RESPONSE BRIEF OF APPELLEE 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS 
This appeal and cross-appeal are taken from a Decree of 
Divorce of the Third Judicial District Court, Murray Department, 
dated May 9, 2000. Respondent, Paul G. Kemp (herein Paul), filed 
a timely notice of appeal on May 18, 2000 (R. 526-27) from the 
decree without specifying the particulars of his challenge. 
Petitioner, Nancy L. Kemp (herein Nancy), filed a timely notice 
of cross-appeal on June 1, 2000 (R. 537-39), challenging the 
amount and duration of alimony, the valuation date of certain 
marital assets, the denial of attorney fees, and certain of the 
trial court's evidentiary rulings. This Court has jurisdiction 
pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(h) (1992) over "appeals 
from district court involving domestic relations cases, 
including, but not limited to, divorce, annulment, property 
division, child custody, support, visitation, adoption, and 
paternity." 
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ISSUES PRESENTED UPON APPEAL AND STANDARDS OF APPELLATE REVIEW 
1. The trial court erroneously reduced the amount of 
Nancy's alimony claim by failing to equalize the parties' 
respective standards of living consistent with the lifestyle 
enjoyed by both parties during the marriage. 
Standard of Review: Although determining the amount of 
alimony is generally a factual issue subject to an abuse of 
discretion standard, the issue presented here is a question of 
law because the trial court applied an incorrect legal analysis 
in its determination of the alimony award. Under Howell v. 
Howell, 806 P.2d 1209, 1212 (Utah App. 1991) (quoting Gardner v. 
Gardner, 748 P.2d 1076, 1081 (Utah 1988)), alimony following a 
long-term marriage "should, 'to the extent possible, equalize the 
parties' respective standards of living and maintain them at a 
level as close as possible to that standard of living enjoyed 
during the marriage.'" As the trial court explicitly rejected 
the applicable legal principles, this issue should be reviewed 
for correctness with no deference to the trial courts decision. 
2. The trial court erroneously limited the duration of 
Nancy's alimony award on the basis of speculation as to future 
occurrences. 
Standard of Review: " [Amplication of a legal standard to 
undisputed facts presents a question of law; thus, if the trial 
court erred in the standard it applied, we may review the facts 
to determine whether they nevertheless support the trial court's 
decision under the correct standard." Hansen v. Hansenf 958 P.2d 
2 
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931, 933 (Utah App. 1998). The trial court in the present case 
speculated as to future occurrences and limited the duration of 
the alimony based upon its speculation. Since a trial courts 
award of alimony is properly based on valuations present at the 
time of the Decree, not upon future speculation, Jense v. Jense, 
784 P.2d 1249, 1252 (Utah App. 1989), this is a legal issue 
reviewed for correctness with no deference accorded the trial 
courts decision. 
3. The trial court erred in precluding evidence of Paul's 
vested interest in a family trust, especially in light of the 
trial court's speculation regarding the potential impact of 
retirement on Paul's ability to pay alimony. It likewise erred 
in refusing to admit evidence of Paul's post-separation expenses 
as bearing on his testimony that his post-separation lifestyle 
had not changed from the marital lifestyle. The court further 
erred in admitting a chart, purportedly summarizing Nancy's 
claimed needs, which was not provided to Nancy's counsel until 
moments before trial thereby denying Nancy and her counsel the 
opportunity to scrutinize it. 
Standard of Review; A trial court's ruling on the 
selection, interpretation, and application of a rule of evidence 
is reviewed for correctness. Its balancing of specified factors 
in determining admissibility is reviewed for reasonability or 
abuse of discretion. Utah Dep't of Transp. v. 6200 Assocs., 872 
P.2d 462, 465 (Utah App. 1994). 
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4. The trial court erred by failing to value the parties' 
respective 401(k) and retirement accounts at the time of the 
decree, where it made no finding that the assets in question had 
been dissipated or that Nancy had acted in an obstructive manner. 
Standard of Review; A reviewing court "will overturn the 
trial court's judgment when there has been a misunderstanding or 
misapplication of the law resulting in substantial or prejudicial 
error or where there has been such an abuse of discretion that an 
inequity or injustice has resulted." Berger v. Berger, 713 P.2d 
695, 697 (Utah 1985). Because marital assets are to be valued at 
the time of the divorce decree, Parker v. Parker, 2000 UT App 30, 
513, 996 P.2d 565, the trial court's misapplication of law is a 
legal issue reviewed for correctness with no deference accorded 
to the trial courts decision, :• 
5. The trial court improperly denied Nancy's claim for 
attorney fees and costs where she was the prevailing party, it 
was undisputed that her fees and costs were necessarily and 
reasonably incurred, and she demonstrated a financial need. 
Standard of Review: A trial court's failure to award the 
requested amount of attorney fees without reasonable 
justification is reviewed for abuse of discretion. Wilde v. 
Wilde, 969 P.2d 438, 444 (Utah App. 1998); see also Bell, 810 
P.2d at 494. 
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CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES 
All relevant text of constitutional provisions, statutes, 
and rules pertinent to the issues before the Court is contained 
in the body of this brief. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Nature of the Case, Course of Proceedings, and Disposition 
Below 
Nancy filed the petition in this action on February 17, 1999 
(R. 1-6). The petition sought, inter alia, alimony in the 
monthly amount of $1,571.00 (R. 2, 14) and attorney fees and 
costs (R. 6, prayer for relief, 1 8 ) . In his answer (R. 13-14), 
Paul placed both alimony and attorney fees at issue. He then 
moved for summary judgment (R. 19-20), arguing in his memorandum 
(R. 21-28) that since Nancy had been able to reduce her post-
separation expenses to her income level, she was not entitled to 
alimony as a matter of law. The memorandum blatantly ignored the 
statutory mandate requiring the trial court to consider the 
duration of the parties' marriage, then nearly 29 years, and also 
failed to cite the numerous case precedents requiring that the 
parties' marital standard of living should, as nearly as 
possible, be maintained post-divorce. Nancy filed a memorandum 
opposing the motion (R. 31-69). A hearing was held on August 4, 
1999, and the motion was denied from the bench (R. 105-06). 
Nancy then moved for temporary relief (R. 102-04) on grounds 
enumerated in her affidavit (R. 74-101). The motion was granted 
(R. 182-85) over Paul's opposition (R. 117-26). Paul filed both 
5 
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an objection to the decision and request for reconsideration 
(R. 186-89) and a subsequent objection to the form of the order 
(R. 201-02), all of which were denied from the bench at a 
November 8, 1999 hearing (R. 256-57). 
In discovery, Paul refused to acknowledge the existence of a 
family trust in which he is a named beneficiary (R. 220) even 
though both parties were present during a discussion with a trust 
officer. Nancy then moved to compel discovery of the trust 
agreement (R. 209-10), arguing in her supporting memorandum 
(R. 211-28) that because alimony shall extend under statute to 
the length of the marriage— in its thirtieth year by the time of 
the motion— Paul's vested interest in the family trust was 
relevant to his ability to pay long-term alimony. At the same 
hearing (November 9, 1999) in which it denied Paul's objections-
to the substance and form of Nancy's proposed Order for Temporary 
Relief, the court denied Nancy's Motion to Compel, ruling that 
the trust fund was irrelevant to the issues for decision 
(R. 256). At trial, Nancy renewed her objection to the trial' 
court's previous denial of her motion but Judge Burton remained 
steadfast in his ruling. (R. 575 at 78-82). 
Prior to separation, the parties agreed that the marital 
residence would be refinanced in Paul's sole name and that he 
would market it in a timely manner to resolve the parties' 
respective equity interests (R. 284). Although he orally agreed 
that the residence would be made ready for sale by February, 1999 
(R. 271), Paul failed to market the home. As a result, Nancy 
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sought and received a court order on November 8, 1999, that the 
home be listed by December 8, 1999, for a sum not less than its 
appraised value at the time of separation (R. 257). However, 
once realtors were consulted, the parties learned that (due to 
changed market conditions) the residence had lost value and could 
not be reasonably marketed as appraised. Consequently, Nancy's 
counsel prepared a joint motion (R. 304-05) and stipulation 
(R. 298-303) to reduce the listing price, which Paul refused to 
sign. Nancy was consequently forced to seek a preliminary 
injunction requesting the residence be listed at a reasonable 
price recommended by the selected realtor. The court granted the 
order on December 8, 1999, approximately ten months after the 
date Paul had initially agreed he would have the home placed on 
the market for sale (R. 325-26)v 
Trial was held on February 10, 2000 (R. 384-88). Moments 
before trial began, Paul's attorney handed Nancy's counsel his 
trial exhibits, including a chart that neither Nancy nor her 
counsel had ever seen. Therefore, neither Nancy nor her counsel 
had an opportunity to closely examine the proposed exhibit, which 
purported to compare various documents and pleadings, for errors 
or misrepresentations. The court admitted the chart into 
evidence over Nancy's counsel's objection (R. 575 at 232). 
Even though Paul testified that his standard of living had 
not changed from the standard the parties enjoyed during the 
marriage, the court sustained Paul's objection to admission of a 
document created by Paul himself illustrating his travels during 
7 
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1999 (R. 575 at 64-67), ruling that Paul's post-separation 
lifestyle was not relevant. 
Nancy also presented at trial an Affidavit of Attorney Fees 
(R. 575 at 154-57). Paul did not challenge the affidavit, and 
the court observed that the hourly rate charged was reasonable 
(id. at 157). Nonetheless, even though the Court ruled that 
Nancy prevailed on her request for alimony (R. 395 at 31, 11. 17-
18), and despite the fact that the court found her expenses—not 
including attorney fees—to exceed her income (R. 520, f 9), the 
court denied her request for attorney fees (R. 521, f 13; 
R. 522-23, H 16). 
The court held a hearing to announce its decision on 
February 22, 2000, awarding Nancy alimony in the monthly amount 
of $560.00 (R. 395 at 18, 1. 24 - 19, 1. 5; R. 511, 11 11). In 
response to an inquiry by Paul's attorney, the court stated that 
alimony would continue for 30 years, the term of the marriage 
(id. at 32, 11. 13-14). Admitting that he hadn't thought about 
the duration issue, Judge Burton then speculated on future events 
such as the probability of retirement and the prospective payoff 
of Nancy's mortgage (id. at 33-34) and decided, contrary to the 
argument of Nancy's counsel, that alimony would terminate on 
Nancy's 65th birthday (id^ at 34, 11. 13-14). 
Both parties submitted Findings of Fact and Conclusions of 
Law for the court's consideration (R. 420-29 (Nancy); R. 481-90 
(Paul)). Paul objected to Nancy's Findings (R. 438-40), and 
Nancy objected to Paul's Findings (R. 493-97), resulting in yet 
8 
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another hearing (R. 504-06; see R. 576 generally).l The court 
signed Nancy's Findings and Decree of Divorce on May 9, 2000, the 
day after the hearing (R. 507-23). Paul's appeal (R. 526-27) and 
Nancy's cross-appeal (R. 537-39) followed. 
B. Statement of Relevant Facts 
The parties to this action were married on August 1, 1970 
(R. 508, 1 2), preceding Paul's final year in college (R. 74, 
1 3 ) . Nancy supported the couple for approximately one and a half 
(1 1/2) years with combined part- and full-time jobs while Paul 
obtained his degree and sought employment as an engineer 
(R. 74-75, 1 3). The parties had two sonsf both of whom had 
reached the age of majority and were employed full-time when the 
parties separated (R. 508, 1 4 ) . During the early years of the 
parties' marriage and by agreement of the parties, Nancy stayed 
home and cared for the children while Paul developed his 
engineering career (R. 75, 1 4). Consequently, from the outset 
of the marriage until obtaining full-time employment in late 
1990, Nancy did not work outside the home except in sporadic, 
part-time, low-paid employment that did not interfere with her 
roles as mother and homemaker (R. 508, 1 5 ) . In 1986, after the 
children were full-time students, Nancy entered law school, 
graduating in 1989 (R. 508, 1 5). She thereafter obtained full-
time, career employment in September of 1990 at the Utah Attorney 
1. Nancy's Findings were prepared after receiving a formally requested copy of the official court 
transcription of the Decision Hearing. A similar transcript, attached to Paul's objection and included as an 
addendum to his Appeal Brief, appears at R. 441-479. Paul's transcript is of undisclosed origin, 
apparently not transcribed from the court's original tape recording, and should therefore be disregarded. 
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General's office, which she has held since that time (R. 508, 
5 5). 
During the course of the marriage, Nancy's paycheck was 
routinely deposited to the parties' joint checking account and 
was used to pay recurring expenses such as utility bills and 
mortgage payments (R. 509, I 6). Paul's paycheck was divided 
between cash used equally by the parties during the month and 
deposits to the parties' joint savings account which was used for 
major purchases and to supplement the checking account as 
necessary (R. 509, f 6). Each of the parties had $1,000.00 per 
month in discretionary cash from Paul's paycheck to spend as 
needed to support the marital lifestyle and an additional $150.00 
each to spend as they individually saw fit (R. 509, 1 6). 
The parties separated in late December, 1998, at which time 
Paul was admittedly pursuing a relationship with another woman 
(R. 44, response to interrogatory no. 8), and Nancy filed the 
present action the following February. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Although both parties testified that their combined net 
income was wholly consumed in supporting the marital lifestyle, 
the trial court, in determining alimony, incorrectly focused 
solely on the expenses of Nancy's self-imposed lowered, post-
separation lifestyle in determining its award of alimony. 
Abundant precedent holds that a receiving spouse's post-divorce 
lifestyle should be maintained as nearly to the marital lifestyle 
as possible and that alimony need not be limited to covering 
10 
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basic necessities, but that post-divorce parity lifestyle is 
required. The trial court explicitly rejected Nancy's argument, 
holding that "equalizing the parties" applies only in cases where 
the income is insufficient to provide for the reasonable needs of 
both parties. This interpretation is contrary to precedent and 
cannot stand. 
Moreover, while rejecting proffered testimony of Paul's 
vested interest in a family trust as speculative, the court 
utilized speculation as to the parties' potential retirements and 
Nancy's potential for mortgage payoff at an accelerated rate in a 
manner proposed by Paul (which was inconsistent with the parties 
marital practice) in order to reduce the alimony duration to one-
half the length of the marriage. While future events may serve 
as the basis for subsequent petitions for modifications of an 
alimony award, the court incorrectly relied on speculation in 
limiting the duration of the initial award and, at the same time, 
incorrectly rejected evidence that Paul's income would not 
necessarily be limited to retirement funds when he retired. 
The court also made other prejudicial evidentiary decisions. 
Although Paul testified that his post-separation lifestyle had 
not changed from the lifestyle the parties enjoyed during the 
marriage, the court refused to admit for substantive use a 
document generated by Paul himself that detailed his post-
separation recreational schedule for 1999. Further, the court 
improperly admitted an exhibit for Paul that, while purporting to 
represent Nancy's expenses, was not provided to Nancy and her 
11 
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attorney until moments before trial, denying them the opportunity 
to scrutinize and to verify the accuracy of the figures it 
contained. The court permitted Paul to testify extensively from 
this exhibit and allowed his counsel to question Nancy on it. 
Despite this Court's holding that marital assets should be 
valued at the time of the Decree, the trial court incorrectly 
ordered the parties' retirement and investment plans to be valued 
as of the date of separation, even though those assets continued 
to increase in value throughout the divorce action. The court's 
sole explanation, that "these parties were essentially divorced 
December the 31st of f98" (R. 395 at 7, 11. 6-7), is contrary to 
the record in that no petition had been filed at that time and 
ignores the fact that the parties equity in the marital home was 
not valued as of separation. There is simply no-basis for the 
trial court's failure to value all the assets at the time of the 
Decree. 
Although Nancy prevailed on the issues presented at trial 
and presented an affidavit of fees and costs, the court denied 
her request for attorney fees, finding that since both parties 
had been able to sustain their own attorney fees throughout the 
action, no award of attorney fees was necessary. In making this 
decision, the court ignored its own finding that even without 
considering the fees that Nancy was incurring, the expenses of 
her reduced post-separation lifestyle exceeded her income. The 
Court specifically found the requested fees to be reasonable, and 
12 
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Paul did not challenge them as unreasonable or unnecessarily 
incurred. 
Paul's appeal challenges only the trial court's decision to 
include a reasonable savings account, which accorded with the 
parties' marital practice, as an element of alimony. Paul cites 
no authority supporting this contention, but relies only on 
generic language regarding the purpose of alimony. His analysis 
returns to the same "shortfall" analysis that the trial court 
rejected in Paul's motion for summary judgment: that so long as 
Nancy can support her forcibly reduced, post-separation 
lifestyle, alimony is unnecessary. An alimony decision is, as 
recognized in precedent, a fact-dependent analysis, the primary 
purpose of which is to maintain the parties, as nearly as 
possible, in the lifestyle they enjoyed during the^marriage. 
Where there are sufficient assets to do so, it is error for a 
court to penalize one party for living in reduced circumstances 
pending a fair resolution of a disputed request for alimony. 
Likewise, it is against public policy to encourage profligate 
spending by married couples simply to show, in the event of a 
future divorce, that their income supported a lavish lifestyle. 
So long as accumulating money in a short-term savings account for 
major purchases and unexpected events has been a demonstrated 
practice during the marriage, there is simply no authority to 
ignore it in establishing the amount of alimony. Moreover, 
precedent requires a measure of parity in the parties' post-
divorce income stream. 
13 
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For these reasons, as more fully explained below, Nancy 
respectfully seeks relief from the trial courts' determination 
which correctly found that Nancy should be granted relief but did 
not go far enough in granting said relief as specified in Nancy's 
cross-appeal and denial of Paul's appeal. 
ARGUMENT 
I. THE TRIAL COURT FAILED TO EQUALIZE THE PARTIES' 
POST-DIVORCE STANDARDS OF LIVING AS REQUIRED BY 
PRECEDENT. 
The precedents of Utah's appellate courts leave no doubt 
that "'[an alimony award should, to the extent possible, equalize 
the parties' respective post-divorce living standards . . . .'" 
Howell v. Howell, 806 P.2d 1209, 1211 (Utah App. 1991) (quoting 
Rasband v. Rasband, 752 P.2d 1331, 1333 (Utah App. 1988)). In 
Howell, this.Court noted that the-Supreme Court of Utah has ruled 
likewise, finding that, following a long-term marriage, an award 
of alimony "should, 'to the extent possible, equalize the 
parties' respective standards of living and maintain them at a 
level as close as possible to that standard of living enjoyed 
during the marriage.'" Howell, 806 P.2d at 1212 (quoting Gardner 
v. Gardner, 748 P.2d 1076, 1081 (Utah 1988)). In making a 
determination of alimony, the Court stated that "if the payor 
spouse's resources are adequate, alimony need not be limited to 
provide for only basic needs, but should also consider the 
recipient spouse's 'station in life.'" Id. (quoting Gramme v. 
Gramme, 587 P.2d 144, 147 (Utah 1978)). Moreover, under the 
Court's Howell analysis, "determining standard of living is a 
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'fact-sensitive, subjective task.' We disagree, however, that 
standard of living is determined by actual expenses alone. Those 
expenses may be necessarily lower than needed to maintain an 
appropriate standard of living for various reasons, including, 
possibly, lack of income." Id. (quoting concurring and 
dissenting opinion of Bench, J., 806 P.2d at 1214)). 
The circumstances cited in Howell—that actual expenses at 
the time of trial may be artificially depressed and not fairly 
representative of the marital lifestyle—are precisely the issue 
in the present case. Early in the proceedings, while Nancy was 
recovering at home from major surgery and in substantial pain, 
Paul filed a motion for summary judgment based on her answer to 
an interrogatory asking her to itemize her "actual monthly living 
expenses for each calendar month that you have resided away from 
the marital residence" (R. 25, interrogatory no. 5). 
Nancy's expenses were, of course, curtailed at the time of 
her response by several factors, including but not limited to (1) 
the large food supply that the parties had divided at the time of 
separation and on which she was relying to limit her food 
expenses, (2) food provided by friends during her convalescence 
from major surgery, (3) the inability to travel or maintain 
customary recreational activities during the post-operative 
period, (4) the lack of income which had been available to her in 
the past, and (5) a need to meet the new and additional expense 
of attorney fees and court costs, which she did not include as 
expenses in her response. Nonetheless, throughout this action, 
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Paul has represented as Nancy's lifestyle needs only the minimal 
expenses she reported in the initial interrogatory response and 
has implied that any subsequent correction is simply "padding" on 
Nancy's part. 
At trial, Paul's counsel attempted to demonstrate this point 
by asking if there were differences between the expenses Nancy 
listed on her financial declaration and those listed in her 
responses to Paul's first set of interrogatories (R. 575 at 117, 
11. 7-11). He also inquired if there were differences between 
the expenses listed in the financial declaration and those 
claimed in the motion for temporary support (id. at 117, 1. 25 -
118, 1. 2). Nancy acknowledged the differences, explaining that 
[w]hen I responded to the first set of interrogatories, 
not only was I trying to respond to a direct set of 
questions that were limited in scope, but I also had 
been suffering a great deal of chronic pain from a full 
thickness tear in the right rotator cuff. I was on 
some very heavy-duty pain medication. 
I had been accustomed to living with a budget 
where food doesn't mean food. I wasn't thinking 
categorically in the way that the financial 
declarations have asked me to think and asked me to 
divide my budget. So I also had just moved into a new 
home. I wasn't certain what my expenses would be. 
There wasn't an experience base for that. I was living 
alone for the first time in my life. And to be 
perfectly honest, with the odd circumstances I was 
under, it was very difficult for me to make a clear 
analysis at that time. 
When I got to the Motion for Temporary Relief, I 
was still trying to work from those categories that I 
had—had kind of been forced into by the response to 
the first set of interrogatories and was still on some 
heavy-duty pain medication, was still not living a 
normal life. And, therefore, the longer I have gone in 
this process, now it's been over a year, the more 
accurately I can judge my expenses. 
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R. 575 at 118, 1. 5 - 119, 1. 3. In fact, neither Nancy nor Paul 
had been accustomed to breaking out their expenses during the 
marriage in the categories required by the financial 
declarations, as Paul admitted in an exchange with Nancy's 
attorney: 
Q (By Ms. Urry) Due to the fact that you often paid 
cash for things like cars, maintenance, food, 
skiing, children's lunches—due to the fact that 
you used cash for all of these things, you didn't 
really know how much you spent for food during the 
marriage, did you? Is that correct? 
A [Mr. Kemp] Well, I think that's—from a gross 
amount, that's probably true. I think from a 
budget, we knew approximately what to budget each 
year in total. Did we split out food as a 
specific and know exactly how much? No. 
R. 575 at 39, 11. 4-13. 
The trial testimony also shows the inadequacy of a post-
separation expense-based analysis to determine Nancy's 
appropriate lifestyle. In testifying as to the use of the 
parties' income throughout the marriage, Paul explained, 
Nancy's paycheck went to checking, which paid for the 
house mortgage and most of the routine monthly bills, 
with some extra. It usually grew a little bit. My 
paycheck was split between the bank, the savings 
account, and cash. The cash we split equally. And 
towards the end here, a thousand dollars each, plus an 
additional $150 each, which was the discretionary 
amount that each of us had to spend on whatever we 
wanted to. It was kind of a personal quantity of 
money. 
R.575 at 37, 11. 17-25. He further testified that the money that 
was deposited to the parties' joint savings account, to which the 
parties referred as the "short-term savings account" in order to 
distinguish it from the long-term 401(k) accounts and retirement 
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plans (see R. 575 at 136, 1. 16 - 137, 1. 1), was used throughout 
the marriage for various expenses: 
Q [Ms. Urry] Okay. During the marriage, you had 
money that you kept in a short-term savings 
account; isn't that right? 
A [Mr. Kemp] Correct. 
Q And you utilized money from savings to purchase 
furniture and vehicles; is that correct? 
A That's correct. 
Q Both you and Nancy had access to the marital short-term 
savings account then; is that right? 
A Yes. 
Q And you utilized the short-term savings account for 
college expenses for the children, for car problems, 
for car purchases and for furniture; would that be 
correct? 
A Yes. And any other expenses that would come up. 
Q In fact, you utilized the short-term savings account at 
every phase of your marriage for miscellaneous 
expenses; isn't that right? 
A For miscellaneous expenses? 
Q Yes. 
A How do you mean? 
Q Well, in your deposition—perhaps I can quote you and 
•see-df that sounds accurate. You utilized the short-
term savings account for every phase of your marriage 
for miscellaneous expenses. 
A What does—okay. 
Q Would that be true? 
A All right. Yes. 
R. 575 at 61, 1. 11 - 62, 1. 11. 
Nancy's testimony was similar: 
Q [Ms. Urry] During the marriage did you and Paul 
make most of your purchases using checks and 
credit cards? 
A [Ms. Kemp] No. We made most of our purchases in 
cash. 
Q Did you have a savings account? 
A Yes, we did. 
Q What was the purpose of the savings account? 
A Well, initially, in the early part of our 
marriage, we had established that since I was a 
stay-at-home mom, Paul was the sole source of 
income. And if anything were to happen to him, or 
if he should lose his job or become injured or 
anything of that nature, we would need a cushion 
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in order to get over any kind of problems, get 
them resolved. 
It was our intention to have a six-month 
cushion for expenses. That would include a 
mortgage payment, standard utilities, the bare 
bones of living for a six-month period. As the 
marriage grew and developed, the short-term 
savings account also became the repository for 
accruing money for major expenses, such as 
automobiles, major furniture purchases, other 
things that came along. There was a shed in 
excess of a thousand dollars not too many years 
ago. There was a $1,700 pool table. Many things 
like that. 
Q Would you categorize it the same way Paul did, 
that you had a savings account for all phases of 
the marriage? 
A Absolutely. 
R. 575 110, 1. 11 - 111, 1. 10. She further testified that after 
deducting the $1,150.00 that each party carried on a monthly 
basis (a total of $2,300.00) from Paul's paycheck, the remainder 
of approximately $2,000.00 was deposited to the savings account: 
"So approximately $2,000 a month went into savings and it would 
not be unreasonable for me to maintain our lifelong habit of 
keeping a cushion in savings at a rate of a thousand dollars a 
month, which would be half of what he was depositing" (R. 575 at 
122, 11. 13-17). None of this testimony was controverted or 
challenged in any manner as evidencing the parties' lifestyle. 
In light of this testimony, the trial court clearly erred in 
finding that Nancy's expenses included a monthly savings deposit 
of only $500.00 to her savings account. In the decision hearing, 
the court stated, 
You know, there's an uncontroverted—and 
this—this is the—where—the only place, really, I 
just can't put my finger on how I got this number, 
other than it was just a statement that Ms. Kemp, that 
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she saved $500 a month, just like she wanted to do 
that, just like she'd done in her marriage. 
And to be candid, I just could not figure out 
exactly where that showed up in their expenses and/or 
the lifestyle they lived, other than when they left the 
marriage, each of them seemed to have quite a bit of 
savings money. So, I concluded that during her 
marriage, she was used to saving $500 a month. 
R. 395 at 18, 11. 6-17. 
Although the judge was unable to identify the testimony on 
which he was relying, it apparently occurred during Paul's cross-
examination of Nancy's discovery responses submitted in December, 
1999 (see R. 575 at 176, 11. 1-2). The following terse exchange 
took place: 
Q [Mr. Woodall] Short-term savings, $500. What's 
that for? 
A [Petitioner] Again, that's probably understated. 
During the course of the marriage— 
Q No, not—I'm just asking you what it's for now. 
That's the.cquestion: What's it for now? M 
A The same things that it was during the marriage. 
That would be major furniture purchases, purchases 
of recreational equipment, savings for a cushion 
of six months' expenses. The same kinds of things 
that we saved for in the marriage. 
R. 575 at 183, 11. 14-23 (Emphasis supplied). It is clear from 
the testimony that Nancy was not including in the figure given 
for short-term savings the $400.00 she had identified in the same 
discovery responses as savings for a car (see id. at 182, 
11. 19-24), which she had explained in her prior testimony was 
included in the $2,000.00 monthly, short-term savings deposits 
the parties had made during the marriage. She also noted in her 
testimony that the $500.00 figure (over and above the $400 car 
savings) was probably understated. However, Paul's attorney 
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dismissed this comment by focusing on the purpose, not the 
amount, of the request for short-term savings; therefore, the 
testimony did not even substantively concern the amount of short-
term savings deposits. In light of both parties' prior testimony 
concerning the marital short-term savings account and the 
undisputed testimony as to its amount, for the court to rely on 
this exchange in fixing the requested amount of short-term 
savings at $500.00 is plain error. Moreover, even when the 
source of the $1,000.00 short-term savings request was pointed 
out to the court in the decision hearing, the judge failed to 
consider it.2 
Given the explicit and uncontroverted testimony that during 
the marriage, the parties accrued monthly short-term savings 
deposits of approximately $2/000.00, which were ultimately spent 
in support of the marital lifestyle, the court's conclusion 
cannot be sustained on the record evidence. The evidence 
unambiguously shows that in order to maintain the marital 
lifestyle, Nancy is entitled to a savings deposit of $1,000.00 a 
month—one-half of the monthly amount the parties routinely 
deposited in the course of the marriage.3 
2. Judge Burton was fully informed concerning the savings as evidenced by his discussion with 
Nancy. R.395 at 23, 1. 11-25, 1. 3. See a copy of the record of the foregoing discussion attached hereto 
as Addendum A. 
3. Even decreasing this amount by $280.00, the amount to which the court held Nancy entitled 
for the purchase of a car (R. 510, *! 9(g)), Nancy's monthly savings deposit should be $720.00, which 
would result in an upward revision to the trial court's award of alimony from $560.00 to $780.00 per 
month. 
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The testimony clearly shows that the income of both parties 
was consumed in support of the marital lifestyle. While neither 
party could categorize exact expenses, their testimony agreed 
that Nancy's paycheck was consistently deposited into the joint 
checking account and disbursed for recurring monthly expenses, 
while Paul's paycheck was partially consumed by cash outlays, 
with the balance deposited to a joint short-term savings account 
that was used to accumulate funds for larger or extraordinary 
expenses, as well as to provide a liquid cushion of six months' 
expenses in the event of an unplanned interruption in income. 
Given this unchallenged testimony, the marital lifestyle can most 
fairly be defined by adding the parties' gross monthly incomes at 
the time of trial and dividing by two. 
At the time of trial, Paul testified to a gross monthly 
income of $7,340.00 (see R. 575 at 32, 11. 19-20). Nancy's gross 
income per biweekly pay period was $2,048.80 (see Paul's trial 
exh. R-l). Using the trial court's calculation methodology of 
taking the biweekly income, multiplying by 2 6 (the number of pay 
periods in a year), and dividing by 12 (see R. 395 at 10, 1. 13 -
12, 1. 4), Nancy's gross monthly income is $4,439.00, making the 
parties' combined monthly gross income $11,779, or $5,889.50 
each. Subtracting Nancy's monthly gross of $4,439.00 from this 
figure leaves $1,450.50 to be provided as alimony. The trial 
court's $560.00 monthly award is simply inadequate to equalize 
the parties' post-divorce standards of living or to maintain 
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Nancy in the lifestyle the parties enjoyed during the marriage, 
as Howell requires.4 
When an appellate court determines that the trial court has 
erred in its award of alimony, "this Court may either make a 
modification in the decree or remand for entry of a modified 
judgment by the trial court." Higlev v. Higley, 676 P.2d 379, 
382 (Utah 1983). There is no necessity to remand this matter to 
the trial court for recalculation. The relevant figures are all 
of record, and the calculation is merely a technical exercise. 
Paul has at no time denied that he has the ability to pay alimony 
and has, in fact, stipulated to his ability with his attorney 
objecting to the admission of evidence as to his ability as being 
irrelevant based on said stipulation (See R. 575, at 32, 11. 24-
25, at 33, 1. 1). Consequently, this Court is fully capable of 
modifying the decree to reflect the revised amount of alimony 
without the need for further evidentiary proceedings. 
In short, Paul's and the trial court's expense-based 
analysis of Nancy's needs lies on a faulty premise: that her 
reduced post-separation lifestyle defines the marital standard 
for purposes of alimony. The Court rejected this premise in 
4. This methodology has the further advantage of equalizing the tax burden on the parties. 
Because alimony is a deduction from income to Paul and an addition to Nancy's income, each party can 
adjust withholding to compensate for the resulting tax liability. This approach also avoids the necessity of 
having expert testimony regarding the tax consequences resulting from an award of alimony that only 
covers a spouse's "needs." For instance, in this case, Nancy currently receives $560.00 per month in 
alimony that constitutes taxable income to her. She must pay taxes on that sum from the money received 
thereby reducing the amount she actually "nets" that is usable to provide for her expenses and lifestyle. 
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Howell, and the trial court cannot be permitted to disregard this 
Court's precedent. 
II. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN LIMITING THE DURATION OF 
ALIMONY ON THE BASIS OF SPECULATION ABOUT FUTURE 
EVENTS. 
Under Utah Code Ann. § 30-3-5(7)(h) (1998), the duration of 
alimony may not exceed the number of years that the marriage 
existed, absent extraordinary circumstances. In its decision 
hearing, the trial court failed to address the duration of 
alimony until asked by Paul's attorney: 
MR. WOODALL: Duration. I forgot to ask you that. 
THE COURT: I guess it's the 30 years; right? 
(Inaudible) the marriage of 30 years? 
MR. WOODALL: Well, that's the marriage, but 
that's the longest the Court can go. 
THE COURT: Yeah. 
MR. WOODALL: We proposed until age 65 and 
retirement. 
• .:i : . .THE c COURT: I never even thought of that, ^ to.-
duration. 
R. 395 at 32, 11. 11-21. The court then commenced a speculative 
discussion but also failed to take into consideration the length 
of the marriage, a mandatory factor under Utah Code Ann. 
§ 30-3-5(7)(a)(iv) (1998). In the end, the court decided that 
because Nancy could pay off her mortgage in 15 years, she would 
no longer have the expense of a house payment after that time and 
therefore she would not need alimony (see R. 395 at 32, 
1. 23 - 41, 1. 14, attached as Addendum B to this brief). During 
the marriage, the parties paid an additional sum each month on ( 
their 30 year mortgage to reduce the principal and lower 
interest. See R. 575, at 179, 1. 13-25. Paul speculated in his 
I 
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testimony t h a t Nancy could pay more each month, paying off the 
mortgage (a 30 year mortgage s t a r t i n g in December 1998) within 15 
years . R. 575, a t 214, 1. 9 through 217, 1. 21. Even assuming 
tha t Nancy could make payments a t the highly speculat ive 
accelerated f i f teen (15) year payment schedule suggested by Paul 
and adopted by the Court, Nancy would not complete making 
payments u n t i l a t l e a s t seven (7) months a f te r the alimony 
payments ceased pursuant to current court order . 5 
The t r i a l c o u r t ' s duration analysis contains the same er ror 
t ha t pervaded i t s determination of the amount of alimony: i t 
focused exclusively on a needs-based analysis ex i s t ing at t r i a l , 
not on the mar i ta l standard of l iv ing during the marriage. Under 
the mar i ta l standard, the p a r t i e s had money avai lable for various 
purposes as d i f fe ren t needs and des i res arose—Paul admitted as 
much in his testimony tha t the short- term savings account was 
used for miscellaneous expenses in every phase of the marriage 
(see generally R.575 a t 61-62). To suggest t ha t when 
circumstances change, Nancy must reduce her l i f e s t y l e accordingly 
i s pa tent ly unfair and inequi tab le . Had the p a r t i e s remained 
married and continued to pay off t h e i r mortgage a t an accelerated 
r a t e , t h e i r asse t s would have been rea l loca ted to other uses , as 
Nancy pointed out in the decision hearing: 
5. . The Court e r roneous ly r e l i e d upon P a u l ' s tes t imony and 
specu l a t i on , even though Paul i s not an exper t in the area of mortgages or 
amor t i z a t i on . Moreover, Nancy's c a l c u l a t i o n s of h i s monthly expenses ($4,474 
per month r a t h e r than the a c t u a l $3,426 per month) on h i s own F inanc ia l 
Dec la ra t ion were shown to be in obvious e r r o r (See R. 575, a t 92, 1. 1-6) a 
f ac t which should have a l e r t e d the cour t t o be cau t ious of P a u l ' s tes t imony 
regard ing mathematical c a l c u l a t i o n s . 
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MS. KEMP: Your Honor, if the parties were still 
married— 
THE COURT: Right. 
MS. KEMP: —at the time that Paul chooses to 
retire— 
THE COURT: Uh huh. 
MS. KEMP: —then we would have the money 
available that we would no longer be putting into the 
marital residence. 
THE COURT: My— 
MS. KEMP: To do other things with. 
THE COURT: Uh huh. 
MS. KEMP: That is built into the parties' marital 
lifestyle. 
R. 395 at 39, 11. 4-17. 
The court rejected this line of reasoning, instead 
speculating on future events for which no testimony was laid at 
trial, even though the judge showed an awareness that changed 
circumstances can form the basis for a later modification of 
alimony: 
THE COURT: Well, I'm thinking through with kind 
of a—somebody's going to come in at least at age 65 
with changed circumstances, aren't they? Mr. Kemp 
won't be able to pay, Ms. Kemp won't have the same 
obligations, is that fair to say? I mean, he's not 
going to be making 90,000 when he retires. 
MS. URRY: I believe, [Y]our Honor, that the 
resolution of that is to grant [alimony] for the term 
of 30 years, but if there's a change of circumstances, 
that either party can bring it in at that time; but 
otherwise, it should go for— 
THE COURT: Somebody will be gone from here and 
it—whoever's going to fight can fight, huh? 
R. 395 at 33, 11. 2-15. After further discussion, the court 
speculated that, 
When she's 65, she will have paid off her house, 
so a thousand bucks of her need is gone, so I think 
it's a fair conclusion to follow that if circumstances 
stay as they are, which I contemplate that they will, I 
mean I have to envision that they will, it's the only 
way to proceed, is that since she has a thousand less 
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need, she doesn't need the 560 that he is—that I'm 
ordering him to pay to fill what I see as the gap, 
between her need and her ability to meet the need. 
R. 395 at 38, 1. 20 - 39, 1. 3. Oddly, the judge's observation 
that he had to "envision" that "circumstances" will "stay as they 
are" stands in direct contradiction to the basis on which he made 
his decision: that circumstances will change. 
At trial, the court refused to admit testimony on Paul's 
vested interest in a family trust, concluding that it was 
speculative (see R. 575 at 80, 11. 2-20)—even though it bears on 
his continuing ability to make alimony payments after retirement. 
The court, however, did not hesitate to make undocumented 
projections regarding the dates of the parties' respective 
retirements or the prospective payoff of Nancy's mortgage. Such 
speculation is disfavored by this Court. In reviewing a case for 
modification of alimony, the Court observed, 
It is obvious that many circumstances of the 
parties could change materially in eight years or less. 
Accordingly, we think decreasing alimony—based on 
speculation about a future ability to earn—is 
generally inappropriate in view of the court's 
continuing jurisdiction to modify an original decree 
under Utah Code Ann. § 30-3-5 (1987). 
Rasband v. Rasband, 752 P.2d 1331, 1334 n.2 (Utah App. 1988). See 
also Munns v. Munns, 790 P.2d 116, 122 (Utah App. 1990) ("If the 
parties' circumstances change as a result of one or the other's 
receipt of social security and/or retirement benefits, the court, 
with its continuing jurisdiction, may modify the alimony award at 
such time as the entitlement and actual amounts of the benefits 
become definite"). The same reasoning applies here. As even the 
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tibial court acknowledged, the circumstances of the parties in 
this case could change materially in 30 years or less including, 
but not limited to, a change in Paul's earning capacity from 
retirement or for other reasons. To speculate on that or other 
events, in light of the court's continuing jurisdiction to modify 
the original award of alimony, is inappropriate. 
Finally, the court failed to consider the length of the 
parties' marriage, as it is obligated by statute to do. The 
court found that Nancy did not work in a full-time, career 
position outside the home until 1990, spending the first 20 years 
of the marriage as a mother and homemaker (R. 517, f 3), by 
agreement of the parties (R. 75, 5 4). In those 20 years, Paul 
was able to further his career with Nancy's support (id.). Nancy 
will never be able to recapture the 20 years of job experience 
forgone that might otherwise have enhanced her salary to Paul's 
level. Yet the court did not consider this very real effect of 
the parties' long-term marriage on Nancy's earning ability when 
it elected to terminate alimony after only 15 years. 
In sum, the trial court provided no analysis, beyond 
speculation, to terminate alimony short of the 30-year duration 
of the marriage. Moreover, it failed to consider the parties' 
agreement that Nancy would stay at home to raise the children for 
more than half that time while Paul furthered his career. For 
these reasons, the termination of alimony in 15 years cannot 
stand, and Nancy respectfully requests this Court to order 
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reinstatement of alimony for a 30-year term, as the trial court 
initially announced. 
III. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN ADMITTING INTO EVIDENCE 
A CHART NOT PROVIDED TO PETITIONER IN ADVANCE OF TRIAL 
AND IN DECLINING TO ADMIT EVIDENCE RELEVANT TO 
RESPONDENT'S LIFESTYLE AND FINANCIAL INTERESTS. 
Only moments before trial began, Paul's attorney handed 
Nancy's counsel a bound volume of exhibits intended for use at 
trial. Among the exhibits was a chart, allegedly showing Nancy's 
expenses as repor ted at various stages of the proceedings (see 
Paul's exh. R-9). Paul had not previously provided this document 
to Nancy or her counsel. As trial was imminent, Nancy was unable 
to scrutinize the chart for errors or misrepresentations. 
Although counsel objected to the admission of the document, the 
court permitted Paul to testify extensively from it and Nancy to 
be questioned on it, ultimately allowing it into evidence over 
Nancy's objection (see R. 575 at 232, 11. 8-23): 
Q [Mr. Woodall] Did you have the opportunity 
to compare Nancy's needs as she represented them 
throughout this matter? 
A [Mr. Kemp] Yes. 
Q And had we prepared a chart in that regard? 
Let's mark this. I think it's No. 9. 
MS. URRY: Your Honor, I'm going to object to this 
chart. We did not see it before today. We do have 
concerns about the mathematics involved in this, based 
on the financial declaration difficulties.6 
THE COURT: Well, is it a chart with uniquely new 
material, or is it just a— 
6. Earlier testimony established that Paul had misrepresented his expenses on his financial 
declaration by a computational error showing his expenses to be $300.00 greater than their actual sum. 
In addition, he added as separate items his homeowners' insurance and property taxes, even though they 
were also included in the amount he listed as his mortgage payment, and included $300.00 per month in 
tuition for the parties' sons that he was not paying at the time of trial. See R. 575 at 42,1. 19 - 43,1. 20; 
46,1.22-48,1.16; 54,11. 13-21. 
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MS. URRY; We don't know. 
THE COURT: —restatement of what's there. 
MS. URRY: We don't know, Your Honor. 
MR. WOODALL: It's a restatement. It's just 
illustrating his testimony, Your Honor. It's 
illustrative. It's not an evidentiary— 
MS. URRY: We don't even know if this is an 
accurate representation from each of those documents. 
MR. WOODALL: It's just his testimony, Your Honor. 
THE COURT: Well, let's just go ahead and see if 
there's any foundation. And at some point we may or 
may not allow it in. 
R. 575 at 210, 1. 17 - 211, 1. 14. While the court claims to 
have received the chart only for illustrative purposes (see id. 
at 232, 11. 20-23), Nancy was clearly prejudiced by the court's 
apparent presumption of the chart's accuracy and by being 
deprived of a reasonable opportunity to verify the accuracy of 
its contents herself. 
While admitting a document that Nancy had no prior 
opportunity to scrutinize, the court declined to admit for 
substantive purposes portions of a document with which Paul was 
not only thoroughly familiar, but one that he had generated: his 
"vacation planner" (Nancy's exh. P-12), which spanned the last 
several years of the parties' marriage, including calendar year 
1999, during which the parties were separated. Paul objected to 
the 1999 material, as irrelevant and not reflective of the 
parties' marital standard of living (see R. 575 at 64, 
11. 13-15). Nancy explained that the 1999 material was relevant 
to the financial declarations, which were based on the parties' 
post-separation expenses and which demonstrated a disparity in 
the parties' respective standards of living, but the court 
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sustained Paul's objection (see R. 575 at 65, 1. 1 - 69, 1. 12, 
attached as Addendum C), even in light of Paul's testimony that 
his standard of living after separation had not varied from the 
standard of living the parties had enjoyed during the marriage: 
Q [Ms. Urry] Your financial declaration was signed 
October 1999. You stated that that was the same, 
just for Mr. Woodall, as the marital standard of 
living; is that correct? 
A [Mr, Kemp] Okay. Yes. 
R. 575 at 98, 11. 19-22. If, as Paul testified, his 1999 
standard of living did not diverge from the marital standard, 
then Nancy was prejudiced by t ;he trial court's refusal to admit 
the 1999 information for substantive consideration.7 
Finally, the trial court refused to admit testimonial 
evidence as to Paul's vested interest in an irrevocable amily 
trust on the basis that Paul's receipt of his vested interest is 
merely speculative (see H, lWu- at 7(i, 1. 25 - 82, 1. 20, attached 
to this brief as Addendum D).8 However, as explained in Point 
II, above, the court indulged in far greater speculation about 
future events in deciding that alimony si lould terminate in 15 
years due to Paul's potential retirement at age 65 and the 
proposed early payoff of Nancy's mortgage. A vested interest in 
an irrevocable trust is substantially more capable of accurate 
7. An increase in travel is also substantively relevant as it is indicative that Paul's standard of 
living increased, while evidence showed that Nancy's ability to travel and her standard of living decreased 
during separation. 
8. The trust agreement was the object of prior proceedings before the trial court. Nancy moved 
the court to compel discovery of the agreement on the basis of her having seen the document as well as 
participated in discussion about its provisions. See R. 209-35. The court denied the motion from the 
bench at a hearing on November 8, 1999 (R. 256). 
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determination as to its future impact than non-binding 
intentions, such as Nancy's intention to accelerate her mortgage 
payments, and unscheduled presumptions, such as the presumption 
that the parties will retire at some specified age. By failing 
to admit testimony on the existence and value of Paul's interest 
in the trust, as well as by declining to compel discovery of the 
agreement itself, the court prevented Nancy from showing that 
retirement would not necessarily decrease Paul's ability to pay 
alimony, and that any reduction in the duration of alimony should 
consequently be left for later modification proceedings. Given 
the court's subsequent ruling on the duration of alimony, these 
decisions constitute prejudicial error.9 
To the extent that these errors in the admission of evidence 
prejudiced the outcome of the trial, they warrant reversal of the 
trial court's rulings on the amount and duration of alimony, as 
specified in Points I and II, above. 
IV. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED BY FAILING TO VALUE THE 
PARTIES' RESPECTIVE 401(k) AND RETIREMENT ACCOUNTS AT 
THE TIME OF THE DECREE. 
"It is well settled that the present value, as well as any 
deferred earnings of retirement accounts accrued during the 
marriage, are marital assets and, whenever possible, should be 
valued as of the time of the divorce and should be equitably 
divided." Dunn v. Dunn, 802 P.2d 1314, 1319 (Utah App„ 1990); 
9. As noted in a hearing on May 8, 2000, Paul's mother passed away before the Findings of Fact 
and Conclusions of Law and Decree were finalized and signed (R. 576 at 17,11. 1-8). The value of Paul's 
interest has consequently become fixed and could no longer be deemed speculative at that time. 
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see also Rappleve v. Rappleye, 855 P.260, 262 (Utah App. 1993) 
("As a general rule, the marital estate is valued at the time of 
the divorce decree"); Berger v. Berger, 713 P.2d 695, 697 (Utah 
1985) ("The marital estate should be valued as of the time of the 
divorce decree"). While the trial court agreed that the parties1 
respective retirement and 401(k) accounts would be equally 
divided, it erred in valuing these marital assets nearly a year-
and-a-half prior to entry of the decree in this matter. 
In discussing the matter at the decision hearing, Nancy's 
counsel explained that "[n]ormally, under the case law, [these 
accounts] would ego until the decree of divorce was entered and 
then that's what it's valued at. There is an end date and I 
believe it would be at the time of the decree of divorce." 
R. 395 at 6, 11. 12-15. The cour t responded, 
So, if I make a day which in my mind—I mean the—the 
time, if—well, okay. To my mind, these parties were 
essentially divorced December the 31st of '98. I mean, 
at that point, it seemed to me that they lived apart, 
acted divorced, I mean, it had been filed. 
Id. at 7, 11. 4-9. Although Nancy's counsel pointed out that the 
petition was not, in fact, filed unti ] more thai I a nioi ith later 
(see R. 395 at 7, 11. 10-14), the court did not take this fact 
into consideration. The judge also ignored governing case law, 
ruling as follows: 
THE COURT: Does that make it so that when these 
pensions and everything, if a date is fixed and I now 
fix it at December 31, 1998, does that cause problems 
other than be legally improper? I—I can live with 
that because I make mistakes, I can live with my 
mistakes but does it cause problems that you need to 
have clarified? 
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Like, well, I need this answered or I can't figure 
it; or, we understand what we're doing now that we have 
that date. You don't think we do? 
MS. URRY: I think so. I think there's— 
THE COURT: You think you understand? 
MS. URRY: I believe so. 
THE COURT: Okay. 
R. 395 at 9, 11. 7-20. 
Only under certain circumstances may the trial court value 
the marital assets at a time other than the date of the divorce 
decree. "'[W]here one party has dissipated an asset, hidden its 
value or otherwise acted obstructively,' the trial court may, in 
the exercise of its equitable powers, value a marital asset at 
some time other than the time the decree is entered, Andersen v. 
Andersen, 757 P.2d 476, 479 (Utah Ct.App.1988 [sic]), or may 
otherwise hold one party accountable to the other for the 
dissipation of marital assets." Thomas v. Thomas, 1999 UT App 
239, 519, 987 P.2d 603 (alteration in original); see also Parker 
v. Parker, 2000 UT App 30, 513, 996 P.2d 565 (quoting Thomas). 
In the present case, the court could not find that Nancy 
dissipated or hid these assets or acted obstructively with regard 
to them because no such misconduct occurred. To value the 
retirement and 401(k) accounts at a time well prior to the decree 
of divorce unfairly punishes Nancy without reason or legal basis 
to do so. 
Conversely, although the marital residence was appraised in 
December 1998, the court declined to value the parties' equity in 
it as of that date. It subsequently decreased in value, with 
Nancy suffering losses due to Paul's dissipation of the asset 
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caused by his failure to list the home in a timely manner post-
separation. Therefore, the retirement and 401(k) accounts should 
be valued under the circumstances existing at the time of the 
decree, just the same as the equity in the marital home was 
valued under the changed circumstances post-separation. 
In addition, Nancy had no reason to suspect that the court 
would deny her the full measure of the retirement assets accrued 
during the marriage. At the outset of trial, the parties 
discussed the valuation of retirement funds with the court: 
THE COURT: Well, I was thinking, How—no. 
So—I'm just trying to think here. It's going to last 
for 30 years, right, whatever this arrangement is? So 
isn't he on the hook and she's on the hook to share 
their pension proceeds for that time period? 
MR. WOODALL: Sure. 
R. 575 at 15, 1. 23 - 16, 1. 3. Especially given Paul's ready 
agreement that the full 30 years of the marriage would be 
contemplated in the diva sion of the retirement and 401(k) 
accounts, the trial court's later misapplication of law cannot be 
sustained. 
V. THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN DENYING 
PETITIONER'S REQUEST FOR ATTORNEY FEES. 
The award or denial of attorney fees in divorce proceedings 
"must be based on evidence of the financial need of the receiving 
spouse, the ability of the other spouse tc > pay, and the 
reasonableness of the requested fees." Bell v. Bell, 810 P.2d 
489, 493 (Utah App. 1991); see also Wilde v. Wilde, 969 P.2d 438, 
444 (Utah App. 1998) (quoting Bell). In Bell, this Court further 
explained, 
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A court may consider, among other factors, the 
difficulty of the litigation, the efficiency of the 
attorneys, the reasonableness of the number of hours 
spent on the case, the fee customarily charged in the 
locality, the amount involved in the case and the 
result attained, and the expertise and experience of 
the attorneys involved. 
Bell, 810 P.2d at 493-94; see also Rasband, 752 P.2d at 1336 
(stating that "the award must be based on evidence of both 
financial need and reasonableness" and quoting Cabrera v. 
Cottrell, 694 P.2d 622, 624-25 (Utah 1985), for its list of 
appropriate considerations)• 
In the present case, the trial court denied Nancy's request 
for attorney fees, addressing the issue in two findings: 
14. The parties have each paid their own attorney fees 
during the course of litigation. The Court finds that 
attorney fees are not continuing expenses and ought not 
to be calculated as a part of monthly alimony. 
Petitioner's counsel has submitted an affidavit of 
fees. Respondent has not objected to these fees as 
unreasonable or unnecessary but has stated that his 
fees are somewhat less than Petitioner's. The Court 
makes no award of attorney fees to either party in this 
matter. 
R. 512-13, 5 14. Further, 
17. Petitioner has requested an award of attorney 
fees. The Court finds that Petitioner had $13,000.00 
in her savings account at the time of trial.10 Neither 
party had any bills for attorney fees outstanding at 
the time of trial. The Court makes no finding as to 
the amount requested for attorney fees or as to the 
reasonableness or necessity thereof because the Court 
was not inclined to award attorney fees and costs. 
R. 513-14, 5 17. 
10. This consisted of only the money from the joint savings account divided by the parties at the 
time of separation, interest thereon, and the award of temporary support that was designated for other 
purposes. See R. 575 at 162,11. 15-24. 
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Application of the relevant factors demonstrates that the 
court abused its discretion in denying Nancy's request for 
attorney fees and costs. Nancy's financial need is apparent from 
the court's finding that her monthly income is inadequate to meet 
her reasonable expenses, without considering attorney fees as one 
of those expenses, and warrants an award of alimony. The court 
also identified the rate charged by Nancy's counsel as reasonable 
and well within the customary fees charged in the locale. 
Responding to Ms. Urry's statement that "we believe that 
attorney's fees at a hundred dollars per hour is more than 
reasonable in the State of Utah, Your Honor" (R. 575 at 157, 
11. 6-8 )r the court obser wed, "Maybe i lot in the whole state. 
Certainly in this valley, it's more than reasonable" (id. at 157, 
11. 9-10). 
As to the necessity of the fees, Nancy testified to the 
reasons they were incurred: 
Beginning with discovery, I guess, we were provided a 
copy of answers to interrogatories that was not 
verified by Paul. This entailed a call between—or 
some contact between [Nancy's counsel] and Mr. Woodall 
regarding obtaining a verified copy of the answers to 
interrogatories. It took more than one request to 
actually get, so there was a lack of cooperation with 
the discovery process from the outset. 
Following discovery quickly was Mr. Woodall's 
Motion for Summary Judgment which appeared not to be 
based—well-based in law and was also timed just after 
my release from the hospital when I was in a great deal 
of pain and not able to clearly function. We 
nonetheless responded to that, even though it was, as I 
mentioned, ill-taken, in my estimation.11 
11. Given that the court denied the motion, it obviously shared this view. 
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We ultimately had to compel Paul to put the house 
on the market for sale. Oh, I should also mention that 
after we came into court for—on a Motion for Temporary 
Relief, that Mr. Woodall objected not only to the order 
but then objected to the form of the order, both of 
which needed a response and neither of which succeeded 
for him. 
We had to come into court to compel Paul to put 
the house on the market. He wouldn't permit me to come 
into the house to try and make a reasonable estimate as 
to the selling price. Therefore, I was obligated to go 
on the only information we had, which was the 1998 
appraisal. 
After that time—that night he agreed to list the 
house. He listed it at a price that we had ultimately 
agreed to. Or he listed the house and then threatened 
to list—okay, let me back up. 
I'm not sure when the house was listed, but I know 
that he had threatened to list it at—at the price that 
I had no way of knowing was inaccurate, based on the 
1998 appraisal. We then, because he refused to accept 
an offer of a reduced price—he refused to negotiate as 
to a reduced price, we had to come back into court 
saying that now that we had been allowed to do some 
investigation and to find the house was no longer 
capable of being sold at $395,000, that he would list 
it that way anyway and [n]the well becomes poisoned,["] 
in his threatening term. So that obligated more court 
time that was really not of our doing, it was of his 
making. 
It's just been one thing after another. Of 
course, this whole business with the alimony has been a 
battle that we think could have been solved easily 
other ways. 
R. 575 at 154, 1. 20 - 156, 1. 13. Paul neither challenged this 
testimony nor objected to the fee affidavit (id. at 157, 
11. 2-4). 
Finally, at the decision hearing, the court identified Nancy 
as the prevailing party: "Ms. Urry, you're going to have to 
draft [the findings of fact and conclusions of law] 'cause you're 
the prevailing party" (R. 395 at 31, 11. 17-18). Given Nancy's 
prevailing status, her demonstrated financial need, the 
unchallenged necessity to respond to Paul's litigious acts, and 
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the acknowledged reasonableness of the fees, the court abused its 
discretion in choosing not to award attorney fees and costs to 
Nancy. 
The court's observation that at the time of trial, Nancy had 
approximately $13,000.00 in her savings account (R. 513-14, 
I 17), does not warrant a contrary conclusion. The court 
implicitly recognized this fact by awarding her an additional 
lump sum of $5,150.00 (which Paul has not yet paid) in order to 
provide the savings cushion that Nancy had testified was a part 
of the parties" marital lifestyle (see R. 395 at 19, 1. 15 - 20, 
1. II).12 The court also failed to consider Nancy's testimony 
that she had deliberately curtailed her expenses to maximize her 
savings in anticipation of the expenses of litigation: 
Q [Mr. Woodall] How much do you have in your 
savings account? 
A [Ms. Kemp] Due to the uncertainties of my 
budget and my saving desperately for attorney fees, I 
have approximately $13,000. 
Q How much did you have whei i you and Paul 
separated? 
A I don't recall that figure. 
Q Would $8,000 refresh your recollection, or 
should I pull your discovery responses? 
A It was probably close to $9,000. The only 
additions that it has had have been interest and the 
temporary alimony that was ordered. 
Q So when you got the temporary alimony 
payment, that lump sum payment from Paul, you put it in 
savings? 
A Yes, pending the outcome of this trial. 
Q You didn't buy the security system that you 
told the Court you needed to buy with that money, did 
you? 
A Not yet. 
12. The judge mistakenly based the amount of this lump sum award on six months of Nancy's 
income rather than six months' expenses as determined by the court. See pp. 19-21, supra. 
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Q You didn't buy the tires for the car that you 
told the Court you needed? 
A Not yet. 
Q You put it in your savings account? 
A Yes, so that I would have enough money to be 
able to carry this trial through to completion. 
R. 575 at 162, 1. 11 - 163, 1. 8. Nancy's concern for her 
financial ability to cover her litigation expenses should not be 
held against her. 
As with the award of alimony, the Court has sufficient facts 
before it to enter an award of attorney fees and no remand is 
needed for this purpose. Because Nancy, the prevailing party, 
has demonstrated both the need and reasonableness of the fees as 
established in the fee affidavit, she is entitled to an award of 
attorney fees both in the trial court and for her fees on this 
appeal. 
VI. THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ABUSE ITS DISCRETION BY 
INCLUDING MONTHLY DEPOSITS TO A SHORT-TERM SAVINGS 
ACCOUNT, IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE MARITAL LIFESTYLE, AS A 
PART OF BOTH ONGOING AND LUMP SUM ALIMONY. 
In his appeal, Paul claims only that the trial court's 
inclusion of reasonable savings as an element of alimony was an 
abuse of discretion. His argument returns to the same truncated 
analysis that failed in his motion for summary judgment (see 
R. 22-24). Instead of recognizing the statutory factors for 
determining alimony as set forth in Utah Code Ann. § 30-3-5(7)(a) 
(1998), he urges the Court to limit its analysis to three 
factors: Nancy's "reasonable and necessary needs" (Aplt. Brief 
at 4), her ability to support herself, and Paul's ability to make 
up any shortfall. Not only does Paul's analysis misquote the 
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statutory requirements, but it is also not the standard set by 
the precedents Paul cites. 
Both Bell v. Bell and Jones v. Jones make clear that a 
primary purpose of alimony is "to provide support for the wife as 
nearly as possible at the standard of living she enjoyed during 
the marriage." Jones v. Jones, 700 P.2d 1072, 1075 (Utah 1985); 
see also Bell, 810 P.2d at 491. In Williamson v. Williamson, 
1999 UT App 219, 983 - : 1103, the court did, as Paul indicates, 
clarify that when income is insufficient to satisfy both parties1 
needs, the goal of alir . :- •<> equalize the parties' standards 
of living, not just their incomes." Williamson, 1999 UT App. 
219, 111 (emphasis added), However, in the present case, Paul 
has made no showing that the income is insufficient for the needs 
of the parties; to the contrary, he has consistently maintained 
that he has the ability to pay alimony. See R. 575 at 32, 
11. 24-25 ("Mr. Woodall: Objection. Your Honor, we've already 
stipulated that Mr. Kemp has the ability to pay alimony"). 
Williamson is inapposite. 
Nor does Austad v. Austad, 2 Utah 2d 49, 269 P.2d 284 
(1954),13 assist Paul. He has provided no pinpoint citation—in 
fact, no citation at all—-to support his statement that the case 
"makes clear that a spouse is not entitled to more than he or she 
had (and spent) during the marriage" (Aplt. Brief at 6). In 
fact, the primary issue in Austad was whether alimony terminates 
13. It seems odd that, for a case so seemingly dispositive of his appeal, Paul neither lists Austad 
in his table of authorities nor provides a citation in the text of his brief. See Aplt. Brief at 1 and 6. 
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automatically on the recipient spouse's remarriage (see 269 P.2d 
at 286-91). In addition, the case briefly deals with two 
incidents of receiving evidence outside the court (see id. at 
291). Neither the majority opinion nor the concurrence addresses 
the issue for which Paul cites it. Such a bold misrepresentation 
of Austad cannot be tolerated. 
Paul's argument completely fails to recognize the current 
cases that govern this action—cases of which he was made aware 
when Nancy filed her September 27, 1999 reply to his response to 
the Motion for Temporary Relief (see R. 129-30). While he cites 
Howell v. Howell for its definition of "standard of living" 
(Aplt. Brief at 5), he disregards—as he did in the trial 
court—Howell's further observation that "'an alimony award 
should, to the extent possible, equalize the parties' post-
divorce living standards . . . .'" Howell, 806 P.2d at 1211 
(quoting Rasband, 752 P.2d at 1333). He likewise disregards 
Howell's methodology that "trial courts should first, determine 
the financial needs and resources for both parties" (806 P.2d at 
1212) and then "set alimony as permitted by those parameters, to 
approximate the parties' standard of living during the marriage 
as closely as possible" (id.). He completely ignores Howell's 
caution that "[e]xact mathematical equality of income is not 
required, but sufficient parity to allow both parties to be on 
equal footing financially as of the time of the divorce is 
required." 806 P.2d at 1213 n.3; see also Griffith v, Griffith, 
959 P.2d 1015, 1020 (Utah App. 1998), aff'd, 1999 UT 78, 985 P.2d 
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255 (affirming a monthly alimony award that "would satisfy the 
mandatory factors and roughly equalize the parties' economic 
positions"). "The overarching general rule remains the same in 
any divorce case: to provide adequate support for the children 
of the marriage, and to divide the economic assets and income 
stream of the parties so as to permit both to maintain themselves 
after the marriage as nearly as possible at the standard of 
living enjoyed during the marriage." Mortensen v. Mortensen, 760 
P.2d 304, 310 (Utah 1988) (Zimmerman, J., concurring) (citation 
omitted) (emphasis added). 
Under Howell, determining the marital standard of living is 
a task both fact-sensitive and subjective. Howell, 806 P.2d at 
1212; see also Hoagland v. Hoagland, 852 P 2d 1 025 , 1 027 (Utah • ' 
App. 1993) Moreover, "because the needs of the parties to a 
marriage are defined by the parties' own decisions concerning 
their standard of living, an alimony award is highly fact-
specific and dependent on the parties themselves." Crompton v. 
Crompton, 888 P.2d 686, 689 (Utah App 1994).
 Th e parties in the 
present case made a lifestyle choice to value the security of 
accumulating funds for major purchases in the form of a short-
term savings account, as well as maintaining a cushion for 
emergencies, rather than relying on loans and credit cards to pay 
for these expenses.14 
14. To punish Nancy for the parties' fiscal conservatism would be to encourage profligate 
spending by married couples in order to protect their potential rights to alimony. In light of increasing 
bankruptcy filings, credit card debt, and the like, such a message is contrary not only to the well-being of 
intact families but to public policy. 
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Nancy's testimony at trial shows that the funds accumulated 
in the short-term savings account were spent in the course of the 
marriage on items such as a shed that exceeded $1,000.00 and a 
$1,700.00 pool table (see R. 575 at 111, 11. 1-6), expensive 
vehicles (see id. at 124, 11. 2-8), recreational equipment (see 
id. at 125, 1. 23 - 127, 1. 6), a cruise to the Panama Canal that 
cost the parties nearly $6,000.00 including fare and ship 
purchases (see id. at 127, 1. 21 - 128, 1. 10), and over 
$3,000.00 for airline tickets to Florida on one occasion (see id. 
at 132, 11. 10-19). The parties were also considering future 
plans for extensive travel to France and Australia (see id. at 
133, 1. 17 - 134, 1. 10). Under Paul's theory, because these 
expenses were paid from a short-term savings account, they do not 
represent the parties' marital lifestyle and the account cannot 
be included as a reasonable expense, yet if they had been 
financed on a credit card, they would be representative of the 
marital standard of living and consequently Nancy could be 
compensated for them in an award of alimony. 
In Whitehead v. Whitehead, 836 P.2d 814, 816 (Utah App. 
1992), this Court held that "[t]rial courts may exercise broad 
discretion in divorce matters so long as the decision is within 
the confines of legal precedence." Paul has identified no legal 
precedent—including Austad—that requires the exclusion of a 
short-term savings account that has been a part of the marital 
standard of living from consideration as an element of alimony. 
Indeed, he ignores precedent that requires some rough economic 
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parity in economic assets and income stream. This is not "'one 
of those all-too-frequent situations where the court was 
confronted with the impossible task of attempting to cut one 
blanket to cover two beds and satisfy both parties when the truth 
of the matter is that they cannot afford a divorce, but must have 
one anyway.'" Munns, 790 P.2d at 121 (quoting Bader v. Bader, 18 
Utah 2d 407, 424 P.2d 150, 151 (1967). The court properly held 
that a short-term savings account, accruing and providing money 
to pay for purchases and to maintain a cushion for expenses as a 
part of the marital standard of living, was a legitimate element 
of alimony. Paul has afforded the Court no grounds for reversal 
of that decision. 
CONCLUSION 
Although the trial court correctly decided to award alimony 
in this case—including, as one element, deposits to a savings 
account—it improperly limited its award in both amount and 
duration, in part due to its speculation as to future events and 
in part through its refusal to admit evidence of Paul's vested 
interest in a family trust. Moreover, it improperly declined to 
admit, for substantive consideration, evidence that bore directly 
on Paul's assertion that his post-separation lifestyle had not 
varied from the parties' marital standard of living. Further, it 
admitted into evidence a chart that had not been provided to 
Nancy prior to the morning of trial, when Nancy had no reasonable 
opportunity to examine it for errors. These flawed evidentiary 
rulings were prejudicial to Nancy. 
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The trial court ignored longstanding precedent by valuing 
the parties' retirement and 401(k) accounts nearly 18 months 
prior to entry of the Decree of Divorce. This error of law 
deprives Nancy of an equitable division of marital assets to 
which she is entitled. Likewise, the court abused its discretion 
in denying attorney fees to Nancy, who was the prevailing party, 
had demonstrated need, and whose attorney fees were acknowledged 
as reasonable and unchallenged as necessary. 
There is sufficient evidence of record for this Court to 
modify the trial court's decree without remand. Therefore, Nancy 
respectfully requests the Court to grant her cross-appeal and 
implement modifications correcting the trial court's errors and 
abuse of discretion as specified above. In addition, because 
Paul has provided no .basis for overturning the trial court's 
inclusion of savings deposits as an element of its alimony award, 
Nancy requests that Paul's appeal be denied. Finally, she prays 
for an award of attorney fees and costs incurred in pursuing this 
appeal and cross-appeal. 
STATEMENT REGARDING ORAL ARGUMENT AND PUBLISHED OPINION 
Nancy believes that the procedural complexity of this case 
and the novelty of Paul's contention make oral argument desirable 
for clarification of the issues. Consequently, she respectfully 
requests that the Court schedule oral argument in this matter. 
For the same reasons, she believes a published opinion would be 
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helpful to the development of the law in this area. 
DATED this n ( 5£ day of August, 2000. 
Respectfully submitted, 
/ C \i 
PHILLIP W." DYER <C7 
Co-Counsel for Petitioner/Appellee/ 
Cross-Appellant 
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V '-\*-
I can only go from my notes and here it says this and 
this is on Page 9—and I don't know why, I mean I'm 
referring to Page 9 of my notes, but it says savings 500 
and I need 500 just like during the marriage. And so to 
my mind, that was the testimony. 
I know that that number changed a lot, but I 
mean just like those expenses changed. I know what the 
explanation was, but it struck me that the 500 seemed to 
me the only appropriate number that I had any evidence 
for. 
MS. KEMP: Could I explain just 
briefly? 
THE COURT: You could. 
MS. KEMP: You were inquiring as to 
where that amount came from. My paycheck— 
THE COURT: No. I'm sorry, I don't 
think I inquired, I think it was just a question asked 
during the course of somebody's questioning of you. I 
mean, I guess I can go back and we can probably figure 
out who questioned you. I—I wouldn't have been 
questioning you, I'm quite sure. 
MS. KEMP: No, I—I think what I 
meant was, today, you're saying I don't know where that 
figure came from. 
THE COURT: Well, no. No. I know 
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where it came from. I know that my 500 came from your 
testimony, and I think it was on cross-examination, that 
looks like where it came from, on Page 8. On cross-
examination, you said, Yeah, I need 500 just like when 
we—but go ahead if you want to explain it. 
MS. KEMP: My paycheck always got 
directly deposited to the checking account for utilities 
and—and standard bills, as the testimony reflected. His 
paycheck got divided and I think there was testimony to 
this effect, between cash and savings. 
If you look at what was taken out in cash, the 
$2,000 plus 150 each for personal expenses— 
THE COURT: Uh huh. 
MS. KEMP: —that left approximately 
$2,000 per month that got kicked into savings. 
THE COURT: Uh huh. 
MS. KEMP: Some of that went to cars, 
purchase of cars, some of it went to other large 
purchases, but that's where that figure came from. 
THE COURT: Okay. So, I—I guess I' 
be kind of comfortable that my finding that you testified 
it was 500, would also be consistent, like you say, if 
you're buying a car and you've got another 280, there's 
the house, you give him another hundred so you've got 
your 880, that's ball-parkish to a thousand, so I'm 
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comfortable with that. I mean, that's my explanation, I 
got it from the testimony that I heard Ms. Kemp give at 
trial. 
Any other questions, Ms. Urry, I'd be happy to 
try and answer them if I can. 
MS. URRY: Not at the moment. Thank 
you. 
THE COURT: Mr. Woodall? 
MR. WOODALL: Thanks, Judge, and this 
may sound like argument. 
THE COURT: Naw, I'm sure it won't I 
know you'll do your best. 
MR. WOODALL: It seems to me that the 
Court found that the thousand a month for incidentals 
covered the house maintenance as well, so if I—it's— 
THE COURT: No. I said—no, I'm 
sorry. I used the phrase, I think, "running the house". 
MR. WOODALL: Yes. 
THE COURT: And by that, I meant—and 
I don't know—no, running the car was running the car; 
yeah, I don't—• 
MR. WOODALL: Incidentals— 
THE COURT: I didn't have any house 
maintenance in that one. 
MR. WOODALL: So, the thousand does 
25 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
ADDENDUM B 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
conclude, I did find that these folks were really very 
frugal, I mean, here's some people who say that they 
travel a lot and the extent of their travel appear to be 
for the—the great majority of their travel within the 
borders of the State of Utah. It#s not what I would call 
extravagant travel at all, nothing in their life bespeaks 
of extravagance, so given the amount of income, it would 
seem to me that the money has to be going somewhere, so 
given their lifestyle, savings was a part of the life 
they decided to live. 
Yeah, I've amplified on that one, haven't I? 
MR. WOODALL: Uh huh, that's fine. 
THE COURT: Anything else, Mr. 
Woodall? 
MR. WOODALL: No. I think that 
covers it. 
THE COURT: Ms. Urry, you're going to 
have to draft this 'cause you're the prevailing party. 
Do you have anything on—anything else I need to cover 
and answer? 
I know this is a hard one to ask you like 
this— 
MR. WOODALL: Oh, I have a point. 
I'm sorry. 
THE COURT: 'Cause what I—'cause I 
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know you went to a lot of work on the findings. It,s 
just that when I went through and the way I—I at least 
received the evidence, it was hard for me to look at it 
in terms of the proposed findings and conclusions. 
For example, I mean, you were assigning, you 
know, kind of this bad faith to him and Mr. Woodall's 
saying, well, he was the grandest guy and I mean, it's 
fair to do that, but I just was trying to figure out who 
should pay money to maintain the lifestyle. 
Sorry. Go ahead. 
MR. WOODALL: Duration. I forgot to 
ask you that. 
THE COURT: I guess it's the 3 0 
years; right? (Inaudible) the marriage of 30 years? 
MR. WOODALL: Well, that's the 
marriage, but that's the longest the Court can go. 
THE COURT: Yeah. 
MR. WOODALL: We proposed until age 
65 and retirement, 
that, duration, 
this one out, 
THE COURT: I never even thought of 
MS. URRY: No, your Honor. 
THE COURT: Well, now, let me figure 
MR. WOODALL: Giving her alimony to 
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pay her house off in 15 years, 
THE COURT: Well, I'm thinking 
through with kind of a—somebody's going to come in at 
least at age 65 with changed circumstances, aren't they? 
Mr* Kemp won't be able to pay, Ms, Kemp won't have the 
same obligations, is that fair to say? I mean, he's not 
going to be making 90,000 when he retires. 
MS, URRY: I believe, your Honor, 
that the resolution of that is to grant it for the term 
of 30 years, but if there's a change of circumstances, 
that either party can bring it in at that time; but 
otherwise, it should go for— 
THE COURT: Somebody will be gone 
from here and it—whoever's going to fight can fight, 
huh? 
MS. URRY: It's basically permanent 
alimony. 
MR. WOODALL: Judge, if—if you're 
not here in 15 years, the— 
THE COURT: Well, nobody's going to 
remember in 15 years. 
MR. WOODALL: Let me—let me advise 
the Court that the standard for change is—the change has 
to have not been contemplated at the time of the decree 
and—and I have argued and—on both sides of this, that 
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retirement is certainly contemplated and therefore if 
alimony is ordered for 30 years, it runs for 30 years 
irrespective of—of retirement and I don't think that's 
what the Court intends. 
THE COURT: Let's see, we build into 
this, the house is gone; right? Ms. Kemp will have that 
paid off—I'm just thinking out loud because I haven't 
really thought this through. 
MR. WOODALL: We're giving her 15 
years to pay off her house. 
THE COURT: Well, I think she's 
clearly able to do that given the way they both run their 
lives. 
Yeah, in my mind, it ought to be when Ms. Kemp 
reaches her 65th birthday. 
MS. URRY: Actually, the case law has 
provided to that, your Honor, and if there is a change of 
circumstances when it's brought in. Also, we weren't 
allowed to bring in the evidence on the trust fund that 
would be available at that point in time— 
THE COURT: Uh huh. 
MS. URRY: —and therefore, that 
might mean that he has more of an ability at that point. 
We don't know that that's— 
THE COURT: Well, let me say, see I— 
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I'm not worried about his ability 'cause he always had 
the ability; I mean, I need to find that, number one, she 
had need and I've tried to describe to you how I've found 
that need. 
Secondly, she can't meet it because I think she 
is as fully employed as she can be. I mean, I think 
she's done a great job, they both worked together to make 
his life a good life and they worked together to make her 
life a good life; but I think it's fair to say that at 
her age, the job she has is a good job, it's—it's a good 
income, it's a secure job, it's the kind of job that an 
attorney would be happy to have, I think. 
So, she, I think, is about where she can supply 
the most that she can to her needs, so the third factor 
is, because I concluded that he has the ability to pay, 
would be what's her level of need and I find there's a 
stretch and that's how I came out with the award. 
If he, tomorrow, got a job that paid him three 
times this, I don't think she's entitled to more money 
because that would back to the equalization theory. I—I 
think that the amount of money she's going to get is 
never going to be increased and it seems to me that if I 
were to look at it any other way, to say well, let's go 
beyond 65, then it would mean, as Mr. Woodall says, some 
things that she can contemplate. 
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Number one, she isn't going to have the house 
payment; number two, they're both going to make conscious 
decisions to quit work and move on, so I think that's how 
I have to do it. 
MS, URRY: Your Honor, it's—it's 
really speculative as to when he might retire or when— 
THE COURT: No. I'm—I'm looking at 
Ms. Kemp. See, if—isn't she about—aren't you about 50? 
MS. KEMP: Yes. 
THE COURT: In that range? 
MS. KEMP: In that range. 
THE COURT: So, I mean 50 to 65 gives 
her 15 years, she pays off the house, that's 1,017 of 
this, so clearly, her—if she wants to keep working, she 
can, if she wants to retire, she can. And she will not 
need this money to make up the difference between what I 
think is her lifestyle and what she needs to maintain 
that style of life which I—I conclude is, by Utah law, a 
need. 
So, there's where I am, but I'd be happy to 
explain it further if it's not clear. 
MS. URRY: Well, wouldn't Mr. Kemp 
also have the same benefits at that point in time, that 
if he pays off his house at that point, that therefore— 
THE COURT: But see, I mean I— 
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1 MS. URRY: —to equalize— 
2 THE COURT: Maybe I haven't—I've 
3 tried to make it clear. I haven't even looked at what he 
4 got. Like if he had a billion dollars today, it seems to 
5 me my focus is, what does Ms. Kemp need to live the way 
6 they lived? 
7 MS. URRY: However— 
8 THE COURT: And what he has doesn't 
9 seem to me, other than can he pay it, which I've 
10 concluded he can, if he—if he can pay it, then I don't 
11 look at how much more he has. Do you see my point? 
12 MS. URRY: True. But if he's at 65 
13 and if he gets into the same situation with a house that 
14 they had contemplated at the time that they separated— 
15 THE COURT: Right. Right, they 
16 both— 
17 MS. URRY: —that his is paid off and 
18 then— 
19 THE COURT: Right. 
20 MS. URRY: —we still have the same 
21 ability or the same need to maintain the lifestyle. 
22 THE COURT: But see, there won't be 
23 the need for Ms. Kemp. The house will be gone, so a 
24 thousand dollars of her need is gone. He's paying 560 a 
25 month, so clearly she will not have the need—she will 
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not have that need anymore, so that's how I conclude that 
15 years was appropriate. 
I'd be happy to answer any questions on that 
because I have clearly just concluded that right now. 
MS. KEMP: Your Honor? 
THE COURT: Uh huh. 
MS. URRY: Your Honor, actually, it 
does contemplate that if the parties were still married 
at that point in time, they'd still have that additional 
money to work with because they—they would have paid off 
their mortgages. 
THE COURT: Now, you lost me, I'm 
not— 
MS. URRY: In other words, their 
incomes are not equalized anymore or even close to it 
because she's cut off at the age of 65. 
THE COURT: We're not—that—I—I can 
only make this—I'm trying to make this kind of a 
conclusion and a finding. 
When she's 65, she will have paid off her 
house, so a thousand bucks of her need is gone, so I 
think it's a fair conclusion to follow that if 
circumstances stay as they are, which I contemplate that 
they will, I mean I have to envision that they will, it's 
the only way to proceed, is that since she has a thousand 
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less need, she doesn't need the 560 that he is—that I'm 
ordering him to pay to fill what I see as the gap, 
between her need and her ability to meet the need. 
MS. KEMP: Your Honor, if the parties 
were still married— 
THE COURT: Right. 
MS. KEMP: —at the time that Paul 
chooses to retire— 
THE COURT: Uh huh. 
MS. KEMP: —then we would have the 
money available that we would no longer be putting into 
the marital residence. 
THE COURT: My— 
MS. KEMP: To do other things with. 
THE COURT: Uh huh. 
MS. KEMP: That is built into the 
parties' marital lifestyle. 
THE COURT: Well, see and I've just— 
this is a parenthetical thought. It didn't sense that 
the two of you did a lot of anything extravagant beyond 
what—I mean, I found it odd a little bit, that you had 
only been out of the State like two times, two or three 
times, in all the time you've been in Utah, if I 
understood right, once to Ohio, a couple to Florida. 
I never understood that, I didn't know what 
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you—what—what in your lifestyle would there be? 
There's nothing that I could see in the lifestyle the two 
of you had that would be different than the way you were 
living, could live at age 65. 
I—I'm not sure what you're saying, well, we 
contemplated X. What was it you contemplated? I never 
heard any testimony, I—I don't see it, what you're 
contemplating. What would be different in your 
lifestyle? 
MS. KEMP: We were coming up at a 
time where heavy, much heavier travel was being 
contemplated. We talked about an Alaska cruise, we 
talked about a trip to Europe with friends, we talked 
about a trip to Australia. 
THE COURT: Uh huh. 
MS. KEMP: Maureen Henry. Once we 
got past the critical time with the children's tuition 
and— * 
THE COURT: Married them off? 
MS. KEMP: Yes. Getting those kinds 
of responsibilities— 
THE COURT: And everything everybody 
works for. 
MS. KEMP: —then we would have the 
money to be able to live a more extravagant lifestyle and 
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it wouldn't be that we would have more money, it would be 
that the money would be reallocated. 
It wouldn't change the standard of living in 
the amounts that were paid, but it would change the way 
that standard of living played out with the money 
available. 
THE COURT: And see, I'm actually 
going to respond to that, Ms. Kemp, it seems to me that 
when you reach that time, when the houses are paid off, 
'cause you're both now, I mean this is just a change of . 
life, you both have now 15-year mortgage payments, he 
when he gets his new house, you with your new house. 
You're both, until 65, in totally different 
circumstances, and that's number one. 
(Whereupon, this hearing was concluded.) 
* * * 
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current standard of living. But that's not the question. 
The question is what was their standard of living. So I 
don't think h: 
before I thinl 
MS. 
declarations, 
Is '99 adventures are relevant. But the things 
<: make sense. It's fair to talk about those. 
URRY: Your Honor, as far as the financial 
those are based on what they have been living 
on in this last year. That has been 1999. 
THE 
MS. 
1999 has been 
is. And he's 
because she's 




URRY: So all the questions to my client on the 
and will be what her current standard of living 
trying to say her needs are such-and-such 
been able to live frugally, so that's all she 
on. It should be the marital standard of 
the financial declaration does take into 
account the 1999 standard of living for both Mr. Kemp and for 
Mrs. Kemp. It goes to his ability and it goes to her need. 
THE 
where he goes 
MS. 
THE 
and I think--; 
COURT: Right, but at—that may be true. But 
on vacation I just don't think is relevant. 
URRY: It's extremely relevant. 
COURT: Well, I think you've made the record 
/ou know, I mean, one reading this record would 
understand that you have timely objected to Mr.--or timely 
argued Mr. Woodall's objection. But nevertheless, I 
overruled your objection and sustained his objection to this. 
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I overruled your argument. 
And so I'm happy to look at his '98 and whatever 
when they were--they separated at the end of '98; isn't that 
it? 
MS. URRY: Yes. At the end of 1998. 
THE COURT: So, I mean, '98 and prior seems to me 
appropriate. 
MR. WOODALL: Shall we just remove that page? How 
do you want to handle this? 
MS. URRY: We would like to have the others 
admitted, Your Honor, and we would like to continue our 
objection to removing the '99 one. But we do want--
THE COURT: We'll just leave it on the exhibit. 
MS. URRY: We do want to have it admitted, Your 
Honor, so that's the problem. 
THE COURT: Well, I'm not going to—okay. I'm 
going to admit the entire exhibit but just keep out—I mean, 
I'm not going to refer to the first of page 1. I guess 
they're both marked page 1, but I'm just looking at sheet 2 
of page 1, which is the '98 vacation planner. And I guess if 
there's more, then I'll look at that, too. 
MS. URRY: Okay. And so there's no problem with 
the admission of these documents then, Your Honor? 
THE COURT: Well—okay. If the idea is I'm 
admitting the first page as evidence, which to my view of the 
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exhibit is sheet 3, page 1, the 1999 vacation planner, I'm 
not admitting that. But just to keep things neat--I mean, I 
can rip it off if everybody wants to, but I'll just say 







the front page. 
All right. 
I don't know how much more clearer--
No, that's fine, as long as the rest is 
So it's coming in but I'm not admitting 
MR. WOODALL: Or the back page. It's in there 
twice. 
THE COURT: 
gotten that far, so 
And that part, I don't know. I haven't 
I can't tell you that. Yeah, it looks 






just not looking at. 
MS. URRY: 
that his standard of 
testified to that in 
-
I believe also— 
It's a little different format, isn't 
Uh, Your Honor— 
So the last page and the front page I'm 
But I'll admit the whole exhibit. 
I do believe, however, Mr. Kemp has said 
living has not changed. He has 
his deposition. 
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THE COURT: Let's say he did. I don't--so what? 
Let's say he said that. 
MS. URRY: Okay. 
THE COURT: Let's say he's got a better standard of 
living. 
MS. URRY: Or even if it's the same— 
THE COURT: I mean, I don't—so—it doesn't—it 
doesn't seem to matter to me. 
MS. URRY: All right. But — 
THE COURT: What we're going to focus on is how did 
they live when they were together. 
MS. URRY: All right. 
THE COURT: Can she meet that standard? Does he 
need to supply something to bring her up or does she need to 
supply something to bring him up? Isn't that the question? 
MS. URRY: Well, basically in his deposition--
THE COURT: Well, I mean, that's great that he said 
that. I'm not getting—I'm so dense, I guess, Ms. Urry, I 
don't understand what it means. 
MS. URRY: Okay. 
THE COURT: As to the inquiry we have today. 
MS. URRY: Well, the standard of living is the 
marital standard of living. 
THE COURT: Exactly. So let's say he's better off 
today. Let's say he's better off because his aunt died and 
69 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
ADDENDUM D 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
that your parents prepared trus+- instruments? 
MB.. WOODALL : Obi eet i < n , : olevance . 
• r are \ /e goii lg t : :j : 
M M I t he * rusts? Because we prehab ought, to set the tab] e 
»fi that one . 
MS. URRY: Once again, Youi Honor, and this is t«* i 
the record--
TI IE COI JF ;T I Jl i 1: n .h. 
M S . URRYi that there is a trust that's 
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received those amounts, that that mi ght be relevant. 
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anything or know anythi ng about it That once again goes to 
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I I T 1 1E C 01 JI I "I I J i • J ] o k c i y I :j I i c: ; s s t h e r e I i < i, 3 1 :> I : • > a n 
ztj | initial finding, though, when he ' s going to get this; ri gl it ? 
M S > U R R Y : Well, we don't know that, because--
THE COI JRT: So, how will ihat factor — T mean, it's 
TM I kina oi XJ.K.^ * r~ - v ivbe T ! - -r ^ obtuse _\ t..^^, ^ ''• 
i 4 getting i *" . .*/. : --1 is nerson who's "I. 
25 [ in the home. T h e y may be gone tomorrow, they may stay 
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But this--I mean, I don't know anything about this 
trust, but maybe it's with him tomorrow, it's maybe far away. 
What I'm getting at is how do I use that information to 
fashion some remedy today? And if you can help me see how 
that will bear into the calculations, then I can use it. But 
apart from that, then it seems to me to be irrelevant because 
it's speculative; right? 
MS. URRY: It's not speculative. It is an 
irrevocable trust at this--
THE COURT: Well, no, I mean the speculation, 
though, is--the speculative factor is when does it come to 
him? 
MS. URRY: To him, yes. 
THE COURT: And if I don't know that now, which is 
when I have to decide, then I'm just speculating. That's 
what I'm talking about, speculation. Don't know when he'll 
get it. And since I don't know when he'll get it, why does 
it matter how much it is? Wouldn't it be kind of a change in 
circumstance kind of thing? 
MS. URRY: If she knew about what would happen. 
But since the time of the last hearing, for instance, his 
mother, we believe--
MR. WOODALL: Objection, Your Honor, there's—this 
is hearsay. 
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1 11 1E C 0 ( IR T : w e ] 1 ;y e a 1 I , t : h :i s c o u 1 d b e a p r o f f e r o f 
2 k.ind of I iearsay. 
3 
4 testifies, s o. . . 
5 THE COURT: But what I'm getti ng at is--if yoi i 
6 11 i i n k 11 i r o i Igh w i 11 i m e f o r a t i n y b :i 1: I • a t" s ass ume we s p e r id 
7 a lot of time talking about the trust, Wher I we get done, I'n i 
8 s 1: :i ] ] g o :i i i g t :> b e ,1 e f t w :i 1:1 i 11 :i :i s p r o b 1 e i i: i 1: I k i I o \ 
9 all that, how do I appl y what I know to today's problem? Ai id 
10 I • :I o n '" t s e e Jl: I : \ I , i n g :> :ii i I :j I: • :> b e a b ] e 1: :> < • b e c a i i s e :i t" s 
Il Il r lo t g o i r ig t o ve s t : f o r a wl i i l e . 
12 MS. URRY: T h a t ' s t r u e , YoI ir I I o n o r . 
113 THE COURT: And s o I wc >i i ' t be a b l e t o u s e i t . Now 
Il 4 t h en y o u ' v e g o t t h i s o t h e r p r o b 1 e m - - w e 1 1 , c h a n g e o f 
Il 5 c i r c u m s t a n c e may n o t b e e x i s t i n g bi 11 I: Io\ / wj ] ] I s o 1 ve t h a t 
!6 o n e ? I m e a n , t h e r e ' s some t h i n g s t h a t I c a n ' t s o l v e . And 
Il J 1 i : •\ s 1: I e " ] ] I :: i I • : \ I • : i : • i I , t ] :: i i : * 1 I • : \ I :|" ] Jl ] ;: i I : \ i 
Il 8 I - - 1 c a r i"' t o r d e r t h e wor 1 d y e t . 
19 I: 1! WOODAI ,1 .: Can I i i M i. ii i id 1 .1 le Ik i 1 • i ] sc 1 J: ., i1 
1
 t h e r e ' s no e v i d e n c e t h a t 1:his t r u s t e v e n e x i s t s . They ' ve 
a.rgued i t and proffered it, b\ 11 iny cJ :i ei 11 has never testified 
that he has personal knowledge of the existence of a trust, 
He thinks t-h^rp may be one--
)URT: Bi ii : I ' , ; : 'n.- -.V.CI^P, 
I 'Is . Kemp wi 11 say, "w I went to a" 1 meai I, I' ve seen an 
a i 
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affidavit, haven't I, that says, "I went to a family event 
and they were 
MR. 
THE 




all talking about a trust"? 
WOODALL: Right. 
COURT: So, I mean, there will be evidence. 
evidence from someplace. 
WOODALL: That she heard someone talking about 
COURT: Right. But that's why to me, Ms. Urry, 
it's an errand that will take us a long way (inaudible) and I 
won't be able to use any information you get. That's what 
I--how I decide it's irrelevant, the trust. Unless he's 










URRY: No, it's not — 
COURT: I mean, nobody— 
URRY: --regarding payments today. 
COURT: —thinks he is? 
URRY: No. But it would be relevant later. 
COURT: Right, but I—yeah. 
URRY: Thank you, Your Honor. 
Ms. Urry) As to the--your retirement benefits, 
Paul, when you were.asked to itemize all the benefits that 
you're entitle Bd to receive, including but not limited to 
pension or retirement, etc., in both the first and second 
interrogatories that we sent to you, you didn't include your 
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